Origins of the Cold War: concept-map-timeline thing

A concept map that presents the events of the Cold War in chronological order:
http://prezi.com/qddhfhbuftry/?utm_campaign=share&utm_medium=copy

WWII as Total War

Prezi Link:

http://prezi.com/d11xlzivn7gl/?utm_campaign=share&utm_medium=copy

WWII and Total War Packet, pg. 146-149

1. Why did Hitler assume that his airforce could defeat Britain alone?
   Hitler assumed that his airforce could defeat Britain because he was arrogant after the Battle of France; he was able to defeat France so quickly. He also assumed that Britain wouldn't have an airforce to oppose the Luftwaffe.
   
2. What factor, in your opinion, was the most important in Britain's victory in the Battle of Britain?
   Britain had a new warning system: the radar. Despite the fact that Britain's fighter planes were outnumbered, the RAF could locate the incoming enemy and not waste aircraft.
   
3. Why did Hitler invade into the Balkans and why was this significant?
   In September 1940, Mussolini sent an Italian colony of Libya to Egypt; another Italian army invaded Greece from Albania. Both offensives failed, which pulled Hitler into North Africa and the Balkans. This caused the British troops in North Africa to move to the fighting in Greece, which weakened the British in North Africa.
   
4. What were Hitler's motives for attacking the USSR?
   Hitler's motives were more ideological; although he wanted to invade the USSR to achieve Lebensraum, his main focus was to destroy what he viewed as inferior to Germany. The Soviet Union was full of communists, and Hitler saw communism as a destructive force to German culture and society.
   
5. What factors slowed the initial blitzkrieg of Russia?
   Britain refused to accept peace from Germany, which frustrated Hitler and caused him to postpone his plans for invading Russia. He decided to leave Britain undefeated (since he assumed it was not strong enough to open a second front) so that he could invade Britain (which he assumed would be weak and easy to invade).

Pregnant With War

What did Keegan mean when he said, "For the truth of twentieth-century European civilization was that the world it dominated was pregnant with war"?

The conditions in Europe seemed to fit very well for militarization: there was a multiplication of force, populations skyrocketed, and censuses were organized to make recruiting for soldiers easier. Many regiments were formed by conscripts and ex-conscripts, which was the first instance of demographic change. With the increased knowledge of hygiene, mortality rates decreased. With a better organization system on citizens, censuses were able to target individuals for recruitment very easily. Even from the nineteenth century, Keegan reveals that Engels wished for a more organized system for the class of workers when he says, “As an old and increasingly dispirited ideologue, [Engels] sought to persuade himself that the proletariat, by then the captive of Europe’s conscription laws, would liberate itself by subverting the states’ armies from within” (Keegan 12).

WWII Timeline: 1939 - 1941

http://prezi.com/zbl1d4iofp4p/?utm_campaign=share&utm_medium=copy

Why did collective security fail to keep the peace between 1920 and 1935?

During 1920 and 1935, collective security failed to keep peace because the League of Nation's military power was ambiguous and essentially nonexistent, the major powers of the world were absent from the League of Nations, and the members of the League of Nations deliberately undermined the principles of collective security multiple times. The League did not have its own armed forces nor did the Covenant outline any plans for how these armed forces should be used, which created an ineffective military power. The absence of major powers from the League also signified the absence of major social, economic, and political power. Between 1920 and 1935, there were several instances - including the Ruhr Crisis, the Manchurian Crisis, and the Abyssinian Crisis - where members of the League undermined the Covenant. However, the actual possibility of the League of Nations in being able to maintain peace was already rendered to a minimal amount due to external factors, such as the Great Depression in 1929.

One of the major factors that led to the failure of collective security was the ambiguity and the overall lack of military forces of the League. The League of Nations could theoretically call for military action if necessary, but it did not have its own armed forces; furthermore, none of the member states wanted their sovereign forces under international control. The League was intended to practice collective security by imposing moral pressure and economic sanctions to solve disputes. Without any true military power, however, the League encountered problems that prevented them from confronting machinery, which especially arose during the Manchurian Crisis in 1931. The League was unable to impose economic sanctions to solve the Manchurian Crisis; but more importantly, it was unable to use military solutions. Britain had the naval resources to confront the crisis, but due to the overall lack of organization for machinery, Britain was unwilling to act. Thus, the aggressor was able to get away with the aggression, and China, who had originally appealed to the League, never received military or economic support. Military power - or one lack thereof - was a huge importance to the failure of collective security to maintain peace between 1920 and 1935.

Major powers such as USA, USSR, and Germany were absent from the first formation of the League of Nations, which lowered the League's political, social, and economic powers. USA was the most powerful economic country in the world, and it had withdrawn into isolationism. If USA had been part of the League, it would have provided real weight to any economic sanctions imposed by the League. USSR was excluded, which weakened the League because it appeared to only contain capitalist countries. The absence of Germany revealed that the League ignored the fact that Germany remained a strong power at the end of WWI; Germany was militarily defeated in the west but not in the east, which meant that its expansionist politics or economic power had not been evaporated. Had these powers been included in the League, there may have been a possibility of more success at keeping peace via collective security during this era.

The failure of collective security was demonstrated particularly in the Ruhr Crisis of 1923, the Manchurian Crisis of 1931, and the Abyssinian Crisis of 1935, where the power of the League was undermined and rendered powerless in all three instances. During the Ruhr Crisis, France attempted to seize Germany's reparation payments using force; the French and Belgians moved troops into the Ruhr Valley to take what they were owed. This compromised the League's credibility because it appeared that member states were allowed to take independent action whenever it suited them. During the Manchurian Crisis in 1931, China appealed to the League but received no support, therefore leaving the aggressor unpunished for its actions. Collective security was practically finished during the Abyssinian Crisis in 1935, when Mussolini invaded Abyssinia. A permanent member of the League had become victorious through violence and war, and collective security failed to withhold this crisis. Therefore, collective security finally failed and ended after the Abyssinian Crisis - a crisis that was one of many in which the League of Nations was gruesomely undermined and humiliated.

When one views in hindsight the potential ability of the League to uphold collective security to maintain peace, one can see that there were some factors that immensely prevented the success of collective security. One of these factors was the Great Depression that began in 1929. This economic disaster influenced many countries' decisions, making them act by national self-interest rather than in the interest of collective security. The Great Depression was also responsible for preventing economic sanctions as a possible force to subdue countries that opposed the League. So, although historians may argue that the League was doomed to fail to uphold collective security and maintain peace during 1920 through 1935, there were factors that severely limited any chances of success.

Due to poor military power, the absence of major powers, and multiple instances of undermining, the League of Nations was unable to keep the peace between 1920 and 1935. However, it is difficult to say how successful collective security would have been had the Great Depression not coincided with this era.